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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.

v.
DANNY BRENT CRISCOLA,

11092

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant brings error to this court from a
conviction at jury trial of the crimes of burglary in the
second degree and grand larceny in violation of Utah
statutes, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft presiding.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged with burglary in the
second degree and grand larceny on April 20, 1967.
1

A jury trial resulted in a conviction for the crimes as
charged. Judge Bryant H. Croft, Third Judicial District, State of Utah, pronounced judgment on June
30, 1967. A~ a result, appellant was sentenced to confinement at the Utah State Prison for the above meutioned crimes on July 5, 1967.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the judgment be
affirmed and the case remitted to the Third Judicial
District.
STATEI\-IENT OF FACTS
For the purpose of Respondent's arguments presented herein, the statement of facts presented in appellant's brief, as supplemented by argument m respondent's brief is deemed sufficient.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT HAS WAIVED HIS
RIGHT TO RAISE A SEARCH AND SEIZURE
ISSUE THROUGH HIS FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE.
The appellant as Points I and III of his brief,
raises the issue of an illegal search and seizure of prop2

erty from the control of the appellant. The gravaman
of this claim being that certain items were seized from
him by a search of his automobile in violation of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
In his brief, the appellant submits that the failure
to object cannot preclude consideration of the issue
of the legality of the search and seizure, and would
urge this court that the failure to object to the
admission of the tainted evidence did not constitute
an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right at trial" and therefore should be heard on
the matter before this court. (Brief of appellant pp.
25, 26).

Disregarding whatever merit might be found in
appellant's Fourth Amendment arguments, it remains
clear and well established that timely objection to evidence seized in contravention of Constitutional prohibitions must be made to the trial court. Admittedly,
at trial, counsel for appellant raised the nebulous objections to the admission of the crowbar and the sledgehammer on the grounds that possession of the appellant
was not shown and that if shown was too remote in
time to be of probative value.
Of special inerest is the fact, clearly established
in the record, that no objection was made to the court
on the grounds now urged, nor were procedures undertaken to suppress the admission of this evidence prior
to the trial on the merits.
3

Ordinarily grounds of defense or oppos1t10n not
asserted and relied on in the trial court will not be cousidered or given weight on review. Wood v. State, 4
Okla. 436, 112 Pac. 11 (1910). l·i'urther if appellant intended to rely on constitutional objections to
the procedures and events of trial it is incumbent
upon him to assert them to the trial court. Alpha Corporation v. Multnoma (}ountry, 182 Ore. 671, 189
P2d. 988 (1948); Unemployment Com. Dept. v. Hunt,
17 Wash. 2d 228, 135 P.2d 89 (1943). Failure to so
do will not preserve the question of error as to the
admissibility of the evidence, People v. Pickett, 339
Mich. 294, 63 NW 2d 681, 45 A.L.R. 2d 1341 (1954)
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 937, 75 S.Ct. 781, 99 L.ed. 1266
( 1955) ; Coppinger v. Broderick, 37 Ariz. 473, 295
Pac. 780, 81 A.L.R. 419 (1931), and waive any objection to the introduction of the evidence. Byers v.
United States, 273 U.S. 28, 47 S. Ct. 248, 71 L.e<l.
520 ( 1926) ; State v. Bailey, 23 Conn. Supp. 405,
184, A.2d 61 ( 1962); State v. Pokini, 45 Hawaii 295,
367 P.2d 499 89 A.L.R. 2d 1421 (1961); State v.
Davi<lson, 248 La. 161, 177 So. 2d 273 (1967); Martin
v. State, 203 Md. 66, 98 A.2d 8 (1953); State v. Wills,
91 W. Va. 659, 114 S.E. 261, 24 A.L.R. 1398 ( 1922);
See also annotation, People v. Cahan, 50 A.L.R. 2d
583 § II.
As the burden of establishing an irregularity in securring evidence sought to be used against the appellant is
appellant's, it is clear in the instant matter such burden
has not been met. State v. Pokini (supra) ; State v.
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Gardner, 77 Mont. 8, 249 Pac. 574, 52 ALR 454
( 1926). The appellant must support the contention of
illegal search at trial. It is not for the prosecution to lay
a foundation for the admission of the evidence obtained
by the search. United States v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp.
519, 522 ( 1955). See also, State v. Conner, 59 Idaho
695, 89 P.2d 197 (1939); State v. Green, 43 \Vash.
2d. 102, 260 P.2d 343 (1953).
Respondent recognizes an exception to the above
requirements where the accused had no knowledge of
the facts which would have enabled him to file a pretrial motion to suppress the questioned evidence.
Go1iled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 65 L.Ed. 647,
61 S. Ct. 261 (1921).
However, such exception is not urged in the instant
manner, nor is explanation tendered as to appellant's
failure to challenge the admissibility of the evidence
on Fourth Amendment grounds. In many jurisdictions the general rule prevails that an objection
to evidence as obtained by an unlawful search and
seizure would not be timely where it is made the first
time at trial and not raised by a pre-trial motion
to return the property or suppress the evidence. State
v. Spencer, 74 Idaho 173, 258 P.2d 1147 (1953);
State v. Davidson (Supra); People v. Marxhausen, 204
Mich. 559, 171 N.W. 557, 3 ALR 1505 (1919); State
t'. Davis, l Ohio St. 2d 28, 30 Ohio Ops 2d. 16, 203
N.E. 2d 357 (1964); State v. Hochman, 2 Wis. 2d
410, 86 N.W. 2d 446, 77 ALR 2d 784 (1957);
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Potman v. State, 259 Wis. 234, 47 N.W. 2d 884 ( 1951).
An explanation of this rule is found in People v. Heibel,

305 Mich. 710, 9 N.W. 2d 826 (1943) in which the
Michigan Supreme Court holds the trial court should
not be required to stop during the course of the trial
to determine a collateral is.sue as to the legality of the
means by which the prosecution obtained its evidence.
See also State v. Jackson, 336 lVIo. 1068, 83 S ..YV. 2d
87, 103 A.L.R. 339 (1935).

Notwithstanding arguments to the contrary by
appellant, the noting of errors which may have deprived appellant of a fair trial, in the interest of
justice, even in the absenceof objection, is rarely done
and then done with caution and an awareness of the
importance of timely and proper objections. State v.
Smith, 16 Ut. 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965); State v.
Tuttle, 16 Ut. 2d 288, 399 P.2d 580 (1965).
The instant case assumes no such exceptional
character and this court should consider appellant's objections to the introduction of the evidence as having
been waived. The recent case of State v. Tuttle,
(supra) , provides an interesting parallel to the instant
case. This court in Tuttle states in part:
"The practical exigencies of a trial render it
imperative that the trial judge have the prerogative of ruling upon questions of the admissibility of the evidence and upon issues of fact
incidental to that purpose. For this reason and
because of his position of advantage to observe
the demeanor of witnesses and other factors

6

bearing on credibility his ruling thereon should
~ot be disturbed unless it clearly appears he was
in error ...
A further difficulty with the defendant's position is that there was no timely objection made
to the evidence in question ... nor was there any
indication of a contention that there had been
an illegal search. Neither then, nor at the trial,
was there any motion to suppress. On the contrary, during the trial the defendant's counsel
in his questioning continually referred to these
exhibits ... Fairness requires that if he disputed
the competency of the evidence he should make
his objection at the earliest opportunity . . .
Inasmuch as he chose to conduct his examination upon the basis of this evidence, before he
stated his objection to it he should be deemed
to have waived any such objection. (Emphasis
added.) 399 P.2d 580 at 582.
The court then affirmed the conviction by finding
consent to the search and on the above quoted grounds.
Similarly, the appellant now before this court
brings with him a record demonstrating (I) lack of
pre-trial procedure to suppress the questioned evidence,
(2) a failure to object to the admission of the evidence on the grounds now urged an appeal, ( 3) extensive cross-examination of witnesses concerning the
evidence without an inference of questioned acquisition by the police officials. Clearly appellant has waived
his objection to this evidence and in so doing his standing before this court to so argue.

7

POINT II
BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS AS GIVEN BY THE COURT
APPELLANT HAS WAIVED ALL OBJECTIONS TO THEM AND CANNOT BRING
THE INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE
TI-I l S
COURT FOR REVIEW.
Appellant, in his brief, urges error in jury instruction No. 15 (Tr. 39) as wholly inadequate to apprize the jury as to the elements of the crime of grand
larceny. At the conclusion of the trial, the following
dialogue took place between the trial court, the prosecuting attorney, .Mr. Lewis, and defense counsel, .Mr.
Shepherd:
The Court: Gentlemen, as you know, you are
entitled to take your exceptions to my instructions to the jury in their presence but out of their
hearing or you may stipulate that they may be
taken after the jury retires.
Mr. Lewis: We will stipulate that they may
be taken after the jury retires.
Mr. Shepherd: We will so stipulate, your
honor. (Whereupon the jury retires at the hour
of 5 :00 o'clock p.m.)
The Court: Mr. Lewis, do you have any exceptions?
Mr. Lewis: No, your Honor, the State has
none.
The Court: Mr. Shepherd?
Mr. Shepherd: No exceptions, your honor.
8

Utah statutes provide that exceptions to instructions to the jury in criminal cases shall be taken and
preserved as in civil cases. Utah Code Ann. § 77-37 -1
(1953) . Of course it is well established that parties
have a right to make objections to instructions and
preserve challenge to their accuracy. Hanks v. Christeru;en, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 (1960).
In this jurisdiction it has been held that the purpose of exceptions to instructions is to assist the trial
court in giving correct instructions. State v. Valdez,
19 Utah 2d 426, 432 P .2d 53 ( 1967) . Of course a
failure to object to the jury instructions as given by
the court waives consideration of the error now urged.
If appellant felt he was prejudiced by the definition
of the crime as set forth in the questioned instruction,
a specific exception should have been taken and counsel
for appellant should have assisted the court by submitting instructions.
Instructions are not generally the subject of error
because of indefiniteness, matter of form, or omissions
or deficiencies or inaccuracies in expression, if the objections, omissions or deficiencies are not pointed out
at the time they are given. 53 Am. Jur. Trial § 824
(1945).
This court should find that the questioned instruction is not before the court for review, and for the purposes of this case take it as the law governing the case.
53 Am. J ur. Trial § 844 ( 1945) . The cases of State v.
Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1936) and State v.
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Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P.2d 647 (1937) are cited by
appellant as an avoidance of the general rule. lfoth
cases state narrow exceptions, and further in Cobo it
is clear that the trial court had made a clerical error
in instructing the jury as to the included offense of
voluntary manslaughter in a first degree murder prosecution. This court in Cobo found the defective instruetion, even absent an exception lodged, effectively deprived the defendant of his right to be convicted of a
lesser included offense.
In Waid, the trial court charged conflicting instructions as to the quantum of proof required to convict. This court found, again absent timely exception,
that the jury might well have found guilt by a preponderance of the evidence and so reversed the conviction.
Appellant would have this court find such substantial
error in the questioned instruction as to fit within the
Cobo-Waid exception. The major defect urged by the
appellant is the failure to properly define "stealing
was felonious." Commonly larceny is so defined. Larceny
is defined in 32 Am. J ur. Larceny, § ( 1941) as:
The felonious taking and carrying away by
any person of the goods or things of another from
any place ...
Sir William Blackstone defined larceny as: "The
felonious taking and carrying away of the goods of
another," 4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 230. The laws
of the State of Utah define larceny as follows:
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... the felonious stealing, taking, leading or
driving away of the personal property of another. Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-1 (1953); State
v. Allred, 16 Ut. 2d 41, 395 P.2d 535 (1964).
The instructions, therefore, did nothing more than
<lefine the crime charged in terms which have developed
specific historical and legal meaning. Persons of common intelligence and understanding would not be misled in applying the questioned instruction to evidence
as presented in the instant case when the instructions
are viewed totally as they must be. Heywood v. Denver
and R.G.W.R. Co., 6 Utah 2d 155, 307 P.2d 1045
(1957); Badger v. Clayson, 18 Ut. 2d 329, 422 P.2d
665 (1967).
Putting aside the sufficiency or insufficiency of
the instruction it remains clear that the appellant is not
entitled to have this court pass upon the question of
alleged error in instructing the jury for the reason that
no objection was made or exception taken to the charge
at the time it was given or before verdict. State v.
T¥eaver, 78 Utah 55, 6 P.2d 167 (1931).
It is further abundantly clear from the record that
appellant's total contentions on appeal are matters
raised for the first time before this court. It has been
a long and well established principle of appellate procedure in this jurisdiction that such will not be allowed.
In re El-dters Estate, 19 Utah 2d 414, 432 P.2d 45
(1967); Riter v. Cayias, 19 Utah 2d 358, 431 P.2d
358, 431 P.2d 788 (1967); Hamilton v. Salt Lake
11

County Sewage Improvement District, 15 Utah 2d
216, 390 P.2d 235 (1964); Salt Lake City v. Perkin,is,
9 Utah 2d 317, 343 P.2d l106 ( 1959) ; State v. Starlight Club, 17 Utah 2d 174, 406 P.2d 912 (1965).
CONCLUSION
Appellant would have this court suspend the operation of well established procedures and prohibitions to
reach this court with unconvincing arguments. The
waiver of defects complained of by appellant is tirmly
established. The judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully sbmitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
GERALD G. GUNDRY
Assistant Attorney General
State of Utah
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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